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Abstract We investigate proxy auctions, an auction model which is proving very
successful for on-line businesses (e.g., http://www.ebay.com), where a trusted server
manages bids from clients by continuously updating the current price of the item and
the currently winning bid as well as keeping private the winning client’s maximum
bid.
We propose techniques for reducing the trust in the server by defining and achiev-
ing a security property, called server integrity. Informally, this property protects
clients from a novel and large class of attacks from a corrupted server by allow-
ing them to verify the correctness of updates to the current price and the currently
winning bid. Our new auction scheme achieves server integrity and satisfies two im-
portant properties that are not enjoyed by previous work in the literature: it has min-
imal interaction, and only requires a single trusted server. The main ingredients of
our scheme are two minimal-round implementations of zero-knowledge proofs for
proving lower bounds on encrypted values: one based on discrete logarithms that is
more efficient but uses the random oracle assumption, and another based on quadratic
residuosity that only uses standard intractability assumptions but is less efficient.
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1 Introduction
The overwhelming expansion of the Internet is today being accompanied by a large
increase of financial activities and transactions that are conducted on-line. An exam-
ple of notable success is represented by on-line auctions. A few minutes navigation
on the Internet allows to realize the existence of several sites offering easy to im-
plement auctions as a way for anybody to sell items of any kind to the best bidder.
Different are the types of auction that are being offered by these businesses, but one
in particular is becoming very popular: proxy auctions.
Typically, in an auction a server is managing the selling of some item and receiving
bids from clients, eventually choosing one of these bids and the item’s price according
to some method. There are various types of auctions, varying in features, such as
how the sale management is implemented (e.g., a human, a proxy computer server,
or a paper sheet, can act like a server); how the bids are received (e.g., single or
multiple, open or sealed bids that may be based or not on previous bids); and how the
item’s price is selected (e.g., English-style or Vickrey-style). For instance, in the most
popular type of non-computerized auction, a human manages the item sale, multiple
bids are openly offered and can depend on previous ones, and the price is determined
in English-style fashion, meaning that it is set equal to the highest bid. Alternatively,
in the currently most popular type of on-line auction, also called proxy auction, a
server manages the item sale; a client can submit closed bids specifying the maximum
price that he is willing to pay; the current price of the item is updated because of the
various bids; the client offering the highest maximum price before the end of the
auction eventually wins; and the price is determined in Vickrey-style fashion [35],
meaning that it is set equal to a minimal increment amount above the second highest
bid. More precisely, the system acts as an electronic proxy that repeatedly places bids
for the clients (up to the bidder’s specified maximum price) to keep them ahead of
other bidders. Therefore, a bidder can only be outbid if someone else enters a greater
maximum price.
On one hand, proxy auctions seem very attractive, especially for Internet users,
since they can submit their maximum bid and then not care about how the auction
goes until the end of the auction itself. Instead, in open-bid English-style auctions,
users need to carefully listen how the auction goes and repeatedly submit bids to
outbid other bidders.
On the other hand, proxy auctions put a significant amount of trust in servers.
If servers are fully trusted then the auction winner and price are going to be fairly
decided. However, if this is not the case, then both can be compromised. In the interest
of maximizing the final selling price and therefore its commission fee, a server might
both claim that one particular bidder outbid another one without this being the case,
or decide to update the item price by an amount larger than what he is supposed to.
In this paper we present techniques for preventing these types of undesired behav-
ior from corrupted servers in proxy auctions.
Our model, definition and results. We consider a model with several clients who
intend to purchase an item by participating in a proxy auction, and a server, taking
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care of various auction management operations, including setting starting and final
date of the auction, notifying clients of bidding transactions, and updating current
price and currently winning bid.
We present a first formal definition of some basic security properties that one
would expect in this type of auction. In particular, we define security against clients
preventing any other client to win the auction, and privacy against clients trying to
obtain some information about either the current auction winner’s or the final win-
ner’s offered maximum price. Both these properties are already achieved by many
businesses on the Internet (e.g. [1]).
Most importantly, we focus on other security requirements not achieved by busi-
nesses on the Internet, such as server-integrity, also called security against the server.
We formally define this property and propose a simple and efficient auction scheme
that achieves this property without compromising the above mentioned privacy prop-
erty. We do not even compromise the main efficiency property of these schemes: that
is, their round complexity. In fact, we believe one important property of our auction
scheme is that it preserves the number of messages of the original proxy auction
scheme. Specifically, bidding requires a single message from client to server and up-
dating current item value and currently winning bid also requires a single message
from server to client, which is minimal. Another important property of our scheme
is that it uses a single server to guarantee the correctness of the scheme, rather than
many servers that cannot collude, as done previously in many works. Our investi-
gation focused on enhancing the security of auction systems that are used in many
businesses on the Internet. This should be contrasted with essentially all papers on
auctions in the cryptographic literature that instead focus on designing elegant proto-
cols with many interesting security properties but that unfortunately remain very far
from protocols used in practice.
Crucial tools in the design of our auction scheme are two new techniques for
‘lower-bound proof systems’ (i.e., proof systems for proving that an encrypted value
is larger than some known value) with efficient round complexity.
Our first technique assumes that bids are encrypted using known encryption
schemes based on the intractability of computing discrete logarithms, and consists of
interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof systems that requires only 3 messages (or
can require a single message if we use the random oracle assumption), and time and
communication complexity only linear (and with a low multiplicative constant) in the
binary expansion m of the bid, despite the fact that the boolean circuit to express the
lower bound has size quadratic in m. The previous best schemes in the literature [4,
7, 25] focus on minimizing the asymptotic dependencies of the communication com-
plexity on m, sometimes achieving communication complexity constant as a function
of m, but for large constants, and sometimes at the expense of the time complexity.
We note that for our application of a private and server-secure proxy auction scheme,
typically m ≤ 6 suffices, and thus our scheme is preferable.
Our second technique assumes that bids are encrypted using known encryption
schemes based on the intractability of computing quadratic residuosity modulo Blum
integers, and consists of non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof systems (see,
e.g. [5, 10, 11]). Here, we provide the first 1-message lower-bound proof system in the
common random string model under standard intractability assumptions (i.e., without
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using random oracles). This construction is less efficient than the previous one, but
we pay special attention in designing it so that it has improved efficiency with respect
to solutions that could be obtained by directly using general non-interactive zero-
knowledge for N P -complete languages [5, 18] or general composition results for
languages having non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proofs [11].
Related results. Several investigations have been done in the cryptographic litera-
ture on auctions (see, e.g., [6, 14, 22, 28, 30, 32, 33]), mostly dealing with sealed-bid
auctions (i.e., auctions where each client submits a sealed bid, and all bids are simul-
taneously opened at the end of the auction). Some papers (see, e.g., [2, 3, 24, 26, 28])
dealt with Vickrey auctions, but all considered multi-server models to guarantee pro-
tocol correctness and required many rounds of interaction. Having even two servers
has been recognized by the auction designer themselves (e.g., [26]) or in follow-up
papers (e.g., [23, 28]) as a source of easy attacks to the auction scheme.
The problem of computing lower bounds (or range) proofs for encrypted data has
been already studied, for instance, in [4, 7, 25, 27, 34]. However these and other pre-
vious papers provide either interactive solutions or non-interactive solutions that are
proved to be secure under the random oracle assumption. Instead, in this paper we
provide the first non-interactive construction that can be proved secure under conven-
tional cryptographic assumptions (i.e., the hardness of deciding quadratic residuosity
modulo Blum integers). Very recently, another non-interactive lower bound proof was
given in [36] under the subgroup decision problem assumption.
The current paper is a revised and improved version of our previous extended
abstract in [16].
2 Definition of secure proxy auctions
Setup: parties, items, connectivity. The parties involved in a secure proxy auction
are a server, denoted as S, and the clients, denoted as C1,C2, . . . ,Cn. The server is
managing the auctioning of a single item (for simplicity) and the clients are allowed
to send to the server bids they would like to pay in order to buy the item. Server must
be connected with all clients by means of authenticated channels; but connection
between any two clients is not necessary for the auction to properly function.
Basic auction mechanics. At some starting date sd the server S announces on
a public site (e.g., a website associated with the server) the auctioning of the item,
and also defines a starting price sp, a deadline date dd, and a minimal increment Δ.
The time of the auction goes then between sd and dd, where the following happens.
First of all, the item is associated with current price cp and currently winning bid
cwb. While at time sd it holds that cwb = cp = sp, we note that during the auction,
both the current price and the currently winning bid may be modified. Moreover, the
current price will always be publicly known. Right after time sd, each client Ci can
send to the server a message bidi specifying the maximum price mpi that Ci is willing
to pay for the item. If mpi ≥ cp +Δ then the message bidi is considered valid by the
server, who checks if mpi ≥ cwb + Δ. If so, then client Ci will hold the currently
winning bid; that is, the value of cp is updated to cwb + Δ, and cwb is set equal to
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mpi . Otherwise, client Ci is sent a message by S saying that he has been outbid by
another client, the current price cp is updated to mpi + Δ and the value cwb remains
unchanged. At deadline time dd, the client who submitted cwb is declared winner of
the auction and is supposed to buy the item at price cp.
We remark that each client would typically go through a registration phase with
the server in order to be able to take part in the auction, possibly involving some
exchange of personal information. This phase can happen after the starting date of
any particular action.
Protocols. A first protocol involved in the auction scheme is run in the registration
phase between the server and a particular client. We will assume that this phase heav-
ily depends on the specific application and that it can be realized in a quite straight-
forward way, and therefore we will only consider the auction phase from now on.
This phase includes two protocols: the bidding protocol and the price update proto-
col. Although technically not necessary, for sake of efficiency, we will insist that in
our solutions both protocols have minimal round complexity, in that a single message
is sent by one party to the other. In particular, in the bidding protocol a client sends a
single message to the server specifying her maximum price. In the price-update pro-
tocol, the server replies to the client’s bid (for simplicity, we assume that this reply is
publicly posted), and possibly updates the current price and the currently winning bid,
where the reply contains a bid transcript certifying the client’s bid and the server’s
price or winning bid updates.
Requirements. Let m,n denote positive integers and k be a security parameter.
We will denote by sd the starting date, by dd the deadline date, by Δ ∈ {0,1}m the
minimal increment, by cp ∈ {0,1}m the current price, and by cwb ∈ {0,1}m the cur-
rently winning bid. We also let  denote the index in {1, . . . , n} such that mp is the
maximum price submitted by any client during the auction. (Here, the values n,  are
not fixed at the starting date, but only after the deadline date.) If we denote by Πb the
bidding protocol and by Πpu the price update protocol, an execution of a proxy auc-
tion scheme, denoted as Π ≡ (Πb,Πpu), can be written as a sequence (Γ1, . . . ,Γq),
where each Γi is an ordered execution of protocol Πb and protocol Πpu between S
and any one among clients C1, . . . ,Cn.
Given these definitions, we require a secure proxy auction scheme Π ≡ (Πb,Πpu)
to satisfy the following requirements:
Correctness. If S and all clients C1, . . . ,Cn honestly run all executions of proto-
cols Πb and Πpu, then the probability that at the end of the auction scheme the client
C is declared winner is equal to 1.
Security against clients. If S honestly runs all executions of protocols Πb and Πpu,
then for all algorithms C′1, . . . ,C′−1,C′+1, . . . ,C′n, the probability that at the end of
the auction scheme Π the client C is not declared winner is exponentially small (in
k).
Privacy against clients. Let mpi be the maximum price submitted using protocol
Πb from client Ci , at some time t1 when the current price is cp, and let t2 > t1 be a
time (if any) when the current price is updated to cp′ as a result of a new bid with
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maximum price ≤ mpi , and let t3 > t2 > t1 be a time (if any) when the current price
is updated to cp′′ as a result of a new bid with maximum price > mpi .
(Current winner privacy:) Assume that the client Ci is outbid. For all probabilistic
polynomial time algorithms C′1, . . . ,C′i−1,C′i+1, . . . ,C′n, trying to guess the value
of mpi in the time interval [t1, t2] (resp., [t2, t3]), the probability that they succeed
better than randomly choosing among all Δ increments of interval [cp,2m −1] (resp.,
[cp′,2m − 1]), is negligible.
(Final winner privacy:) Assume that client Ci is not outbid and becomes the winner of
the auction. For all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms C′1, . . . ,C′i−1,C′i+1, . . . ,
C′n, trying to guess the value of mpi at any time after time t2, the probability that they
succeed better than randomly choosing among all Δ increments in interval [cp,2m −
1], is negligible.
Security against the server. Assume client Ci and server S′ run an execution of the
bidding protocol Πb and an execution of price update protocol Πpu. Furthermore,
assume that Ci submits a maximum price mpi ≥ cp + Δ during the execution of Πb
and that S′ publicly posts a bid transcript at the end of the execution of Πpu. For any
such server S′, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm J (for judge)
such that the following holds:
(Update of currently winning bidder:) If mpi ≥ cwb + Δ and this execution of
Πb,Πpu does not result in the current price and currently winning bid to be updated
to cwb+Δ and mpi , respectively, then the probability that algorithm J , on input Ci ’s
view during the execution of protocols Πb,Πpu, does not return 1 is exponentially
small in k.
(Update of current price:) If mpi < cwb + Δ and this execution of Πb,Πpu does not
result in the current price to be updated to mpi + Δ, then the probability that algo-
rithm J , on input Ci ’s view during the execution of protocols Πb,Πpu, does not
return 1 is exponentially small in k.
Remark. The above definition captures a novel and large class of somewhat
‘innocent-looking’ (and therefore, more dangerous) attacks from a corrupted server:
for example, incorrect updates of the currently winning bidder (e.g., a server might
try to favor one client over another, even though the latter client’s bid was higher),
and incorrect update of the current price (e.g., a server might try to claim that the
second highest bid was higher than it really was so to increase the current price). We
do not consider but plan to study in the future investigations more ‘risky’ (and thus,
arguably, less likely) attacks from a server, such as denial of service to a particular
client, or coalitions server-client that will favor one client over another during the
auction.
3 Proving lower bounds on encrypted values
A major ingredient of our auction protocol is a type of proof system that will be cru-
cial in guaranteeing our desired server integrity properties. Informally speaking, we
would like to design proof systems that will be used by the server of a proxy auc-
tion to prove that all updates during the execution of the auction are being performed
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according to the prescribed protocol. Such a proof would have to be executed upon
any execution of the update protocol and should be verifiable by all auction members
(that is, not only by the bidder that caused a particular update protocol, or not only by
bidders for the same item). As we will clarify in Sect. 4, all such proofs can be con-
sidered as proofs of lower bounds on encrypted values. In the rest of this section, we
formally define the statement to be proved, recall various types of interactive proof
systems from the cryptography literature, including known proofs of lower bounds on
encrypted values, and present 2 new solutions for such proof systems with desirable
efficiency properties.
3.1 Lower-bounds proofs: definitions and preliminaries
We denote a public-key encryption scheme as a triple (KG,E,D) of (probabilistic)
algorithms, formally described as follows: KG is the key-generation algorithm that,
on input a security parameter (in unary) 1k , returns a public key pk and a secret
key sk; E is the encryption algorithm that, on input public key pk and a message d ,
returns a ciphertext c; and D is the decryption algorithm that, on input public key pk,
secret key sk and a ciphertext c, returns a message d or a decryption failure symbol
⊥. Given any public-key encryption scheme (KG,E,D), we define language
GT(KG,E,D) = {(1m;pk; c; t) s.t. |D(sk,pk, c)| = m, |t | = m, D(sk,pk, c) > t},
briefly denoted as GT, and investigate interactive proof systems for language GT.
Recall that an interactive proof system [21] for a language L is a 2-party protocol
between two efficient interacting algorithms, called the prover P and the verifier V.
On input a string x, P tries to convince V that x ∈ L, by exchanging messages, possi-
bly computed using random bits, so that at the end of the communication, V returns:
accept or reject, to communicate its decision about P’s claim that x ∈ L. Formally
speaking, an interactive proof system for language L is a pair (P,V) of efficient inter-
acting algorithms that satisfies the following requirements (where kx = |x| denotes
the length of the input x common to P and V). If x ∈ L then the probability that V
does not return accept at the end of the protocol is negligible in kx (this is the com-
pleteness requirement). If x ∈ L then the probability that V returns accept at the end
of the protocol is negligible in kx (this is the soundness requirement). Non-interactive
proof systems of [5] are similarly defined, but here, the prover and verifier share a
public random string, called the reference string, that can be used to compute their
messages. Thus, the probability in the completeness and soundness requirements is
also over the random choice of the reference string.
In the rest of this section we investigate various types of interactive and non-
interactive proof systems for language GT, also called lower-bound proof systems,
with specific security and efficiency properties, which we now discuss.
Security properties. Zero-knowledge proof systems [21] are proof systems with the
additional security property that no information is revealed to a possibly cheating
verifier in addition to the fact that x ∈ L. Honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs are
a variant of zero-knowledge proof where this additional security property is only
required to hold against verifiers that follow their protocol correctly. We note that
298 G. Di Crescenzo et al.
the study of zero-knowledge proof systems is a very active research sub-area in the
cryptography and computational complexity research areas (see, e.g., [19]) in both the
interactive and non-interactive model. In this paper we will design some lower-bound
proof systems with zero-knowledge and honest-verifier zero-knowledge properties.
Typically, designing a proof system with stronger security requirements comes with
harder to achieve efficiency requirements.
Efficiency properties. Following the literature, we will consider the following effi-
ciency metrics, associated to a proof system (P,V), where an execution of the proof
system takes as input an kx -bit string x, and the metrics are measured as a function of
kx : the round complexity, that is, the number of messages exchanged by P and V; the
communication complexity, that is, the sum of the lengths of all messages exchanged
by P and V; and the time complexity, that is, the maximum running time of P and V.
Although a natural goal is that of minimizing all three efficiency metrics, we
will especially focus on decreasing the round and communication complexity, which
seems the most sensitive metric in a typical execution of a proxy auction (as later
explained in more detail). In particular, for n˜ = 1,2, we will target n˜-message lower-
bound proof systems, consisting of a message sent by V (empty in the case n˜ = 1)
followed by a message sent by P, as these proof systems will not increase the round
complexity of a proxy auction protocol (as later explained in more detail).
Rewriting language GT. For any t ∈ {0,1}m, and for any ciphertext c computed
using the encryption algorithm E on input public key pk and an m-bit message d ,
we denote as t1 ◦ · · · ◦ tm the binary representation of t , and as d1 ◦ · · · ◦ dm the
binary representation of d = D(pk, sk, c), assuming that the latter is different from
⊥. In other words, t = t12m−1 + t22m−2 + · · · + tm−12 + tm, and d = d12m−1 +
d22m−2 + · · · + dm−12 + dm. Also, let ∨,∧,⊕ denote the logical boolean OR, AND,
XOR operators, respectively. Then the statement D(sk,pk, c) > t in the definition of
language GT is equivalent to the following one:
Φ0(d, t) =
m∨
j=1
⎡
⎣ (dj = 1) ∧ (tj = 0) ∧
⎛
⎝
j−1∧
i=1
di ⊕ ti
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ .
In both of our constructions of lower bound proof systems, for different reasons,
it will be convenient to use a rewriting of the above formula Φ0. Specifically, we
note that the negation Φ0 of Φ0, which represents the statement D(sk,pk, c) ≤ t , is
equivalent to
(
m∧
i=1
di ⊕ ti
)
∨
m∨
j=1
⎡
⎣ (dj = 0) ∧ (tj = 1) ∧
⎛
⎝
j−1∧
i=1
di ⊕ ti
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ .
Therefore, if we define tm+1 = 1 and dm+1 = 0, we have that an alternative way of
writing Φ0 is
Φ1(d, t) = Φ0 =
m+1∧
j=1
⎡
⎣ tj ∨ dj ∨
⎛
⎝
j−1∨
i=1
tj ⊕ dj
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ .
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Note that both formulae Φ0,Φ1 have size quadratic in m.
Equality proofs. Our auction scheme will also need equality proof systems, denoting
proof systems for the language
EQ(KG,E,D) = {(1m;pk; c; t) s.t. |D(sk,pk, c)| = m, |t | = m, D(sk,pk, c) = t},
briefly denoted as EQ, where (KG,E,D) denotes an arbitrary public-key encryption
scheme. In our constructions we will use encryption schemes for which it is simple
to exhibit 1-message equality proof systems.
3.2 Lower-bound and equality proofs under the random oracle assumption
We define an encryption scheme and a lower-bound proof system for the associ-
ated language GT, based on an arbitrary public-key encryption scheme, an arbitrary
pseudo-random generator, and the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. The
resulting lower-bound proof system requires 3 messages, but can be transformed into
a 1-message lower-bound proof system using the random oracle assumption. The
communication and time complexity of the proof system is only linear in the value
m. Specifically, we obtain the following
Theorem 1 Assuming the existence of both secure public-key encryption schemes
and secure pseudo-random generators, and assuming the hardness of the discrete
logarithm problem, there exists (constructively) a 3-message, honest-verifier zero-
knowledge, lower-bound proof system with communication and time complexity lin-
ear in m, where m is the length of the first input to the proof system. By further mak-
ing the random oracle assumption, this system can be transformed into a 1-message
zero-knowledge lower-bound proof system.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to proving Theorem 1.
One main idea in our construction is that of designing an encryption scheme (based
on the commitment scheme from [29]) having the following special homomorphic
property: the product of two ciphertexts each encrypting a single bit results in an en-
cryption of the OR of the encrypted bits. This, together with the rewriting of language
GT by using formula Φ1, and using the efficient proof of knowledge from [31], al-
lows us to construct a 3-message lower-bound proof system associated with the above
encryption scheme, having time and communication complexity only linear in m (de-
spite the size of Φ0,Φ1 being quadratic in m). Rewriting formula Φ0 in its equivalent
form Φ1 is crucial to be able to apply the homomorphic properties of our encryption
scheme.
We start the proof of Theorem 1 by recalling basic definitions of the tools and
assumptions used and then present our construction.
Tools and assumptions. We use one arbitrary public-key encryption scheme
(aKG,aE,aD), where aKG is the key generation algorithm, aE is the encryption
algorithm and aD is the decryption algorithm.
We also use an arbitrary pseudo-random generator (see, e.g., [19]). Recall that a
pseudo-random generator G is a function family, where each element gw maps a w-
bit input, called the seed, to a p(w)-bit output, for some given arbitrary polynomial p,
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such that if the w-bit seed is uniformly distributed, then the output is computationally
indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over p(w) bits.
Let G be a group of order q , for some large prime q > 2k , let 〈G〉 denote its (short)
description, let Zq = {0, . . . , q − 1}, and assume that G is a multiplicative group.
Let p,q be primes such that p = 2q + 1 and let Gq denote the only subgroup
of Zp of order q . We note that it can be efficiently decided whether an integer a is
in Gq , by checking that aq ≡ 1 modp. Moreover, any element of Gq different from
1 generates such a subgroup. For any y,g ∈ Gq , if g = 1 the discrete logarithm of
y in base g is the element x ∈ Zq such that gx = y modp. The discrete logarithm
assumption says that for any polynomial-time algorithm A, the probability that A, on
input (p, q, g, y), returns the discrete logarithm x of y, in base g, where g generates
Zp , is negligible in k.
The random oracle assumption postulates the existence of a (black-box) function
H that maps a given input to a uniformly distributed output. It facilitates the design
of cryptographic protocols in many ways, including by reducing a protocol’s round
complexity, as first suggested in [17], and done here as well. Random oracles do not
exist in real life (see [9], for example) and thus, although constructions based on this
assumption are often used in practice, the associated security properties should be
relied upon with appropriate caution.
Our 3-message construction. Our public-key encryption scheme (KG,E,D) is de-
fined as follows. On input 1k , algorithm KG runs algorithm aKG on input 1k and
obtains a pair (apk,ask). Then KG generates k-bit primes p,q such that p = 2q + 1
and a generator g for group Gq defined above, randomly chooses an integer x ∈ Zq
and computes h = gx modp. Finally, KG sets pk = (apk,p, q, g,h,G) and sk = ask
and returns (pk, sk).
On input public key pk and m-bit message d , algorithm E does the following.
First, it writes d in its binary expansion d1 ◦ · · · ◦ dm. Then it randomly chooses
two seeds s1, s2 for pseudo-random generator G and computes two mk-bit pseudo-
random strings (a1, . . . , am) = G(s1), and (b1, . . . , bm) = G(s2), where ai, bi ∈ Zq ,
for i = 1, . . . ,m. The pseudo-random strings are used to compute commitment values
zi = gai hdi ·bi modp, for i = 1, . . . ,m, and the seeds s1, s2 are encrypted as c0 =
aE(apk, (s1, s2)). Finally, algorithm E returns ciphertext c = (c0, z1, . . . , zm).
On input public key pk, secret key sk and ciphertext c = (c0, z1, . . . , zm),
algorithm D does the following. First, it decrypts c0 by computing (s1, s2) =
aD(apk,ask, c0) and uses the pseudo-random generator G to compute the two
mk-bit pseudo-random strings (a1, . . . , am) = G(s1), and (b1, . . . , bm) = G(s2).
Then, for i = 1, . . . ,m algorithm D sets di = 1 if zi = gai hbi modp, or di = 0 if
zi = gai modp. Finally, D returns plaintext d = d1 ◦ · · · ◦ dm.
Given the above cryptosystem (KG,E,D), we can define language
GT(KG,E,D) = {(1m;pk; c; t) s.t. |D(sk,pk, c)| = m, |t | = m, D(sk,pk, c) > t},
briefly referred as GT, where pk = (apk,p, q, g,h,G), c = (c0, z1, . . . , zm), and sk =
ask. Because the conditions |D(sk,pk, c)| = m and |t | = m are satisfied for the above
scheme (KG,E,D), to construct a lower bound proof system for GT, we only need
to construct a proof system for proving statement D(sk,pk, c) > t . Our approach to
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do that is to consider a boolean circuit, on input d1, . . . , dm, t1, . . . , tm, describing
this statement. Specifically, we use the circuit Φ1(d, t) defined in Sect. 3.1, and give
a proof system that this circuit is satisfied when d = D(sk,pk, c) is only known to
the prover and is not revealed to the verifier. We show how to construct the latter
proof bottom-up: starting by a proof system for an atomic statement ‘di = 1’ to more
composed statements, until we obtain a proof system for statement ‘Φ1(d, t) = 1’.
Proving statement ‘di = 0’. First of all, we note that P, who knows the plaintext d ,
does not know the discrete logarithm of h in base g, and thus, by construction of
commitment key zi , it holds that when di = 0 (resp., d1 = 1) P knows (resp. does not
know) the discrete logarithm ai of zi modulo g. Thus, to construct a proof system
that ‘di = 0’, we can use the 3-message proof of knowledge of the discrete loga-
rithm of zi modulo p in base g from [31]. Briefly speaking, this proof system goes
as follows: the prover randomly chooses r ∈ Zq , computes R = gr modp and sends
R to the verifier; the verifier replies by sending a random challenge c˜ ∈ Zq to the
prover; finally the prover sends s = r + ai · c˜ modq to the verifier, who returns: ac-
cept if gs = Ryc˜ modp or reject otherwise. This proof system satisfies completeness,
soundness under the discrete logarithm assumption (as a prover correctly answer-
ing two challenges c˜, c˜′ from the verifier can be used to compute the discrete loga-
rithm of h) and honest-verifier zero-knowledge (as a simulator knowing the verifier’s
challenge c˜ can perfectly simulate both messages R, s from the prover by randomly
choosing s ∈ Zq and computing R = gsy−c˜ modq).
Proving statement ‘di = 1’. Using an analogous argument, we have now that when
di = 1 (resp., d1 = 0) P knows (resp. does not know) the discrete logarithm of zih−bi
modulo g. Thus, to construct a proof system that ‘di = 1’, we can use the same 3-
message proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of zih−bi in base g from [31],
if we additionally require that the prover sends seed s2 in his first message, which can
be used by the verifier to compute bi .
Proving statement ‘∨i−1j=1((dj = 1) ⊕ (tj = 1))’. We note that all bits tj are known
to the verifier, and thus each statement ‘(dj = 1) ⊕ (tj = 1)’ is either of the form
‘dj = 0’ (when tj = 1) or of the form ‘dj = 1’ (when tj = 0). For b = 0,1, let
Setb ⊆ {1, . . . , i − 1} be the set of indices j such that tj = b. We note that when
the statement ‘ ∨i−1j=1 ((dj = 1) ⊕ (tj = 1))’ is true (resp., false), then P knows (resp.
does not know) the discrete logarithm of (∏i−1j=1 zj ) · h−u, where u =
∑
j∈Set0 bj .
Thus, to construct a proof system for this statement, we can use the 3-message proof
of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of (
∏i−1
j=1 zj ) · h−u in base g from [31], if
we additionally require that the prover sends s2 in his first message, which can be
used by the verifier to compute all bj values when j ∈ Set0. As for the previous two
proof systems, this proof system satisfies completeness, soundness under the discrete
logarithm assumption and honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
Proving statement ‘Φ1(d, t) = 1’. We can write Φ1(d, t) as ∧m+1i=1 Ti , where Ti =
‘((ti = 0) ∨ (di = 1) ∨i−1j=1 ((dj = 1) ⊕ (tj = 1)))’. Since all bits tj are known to the
verifier, this can be further simplified as Φ1(d, t) = ∧i:ti=1Ui , where Ui = ‘((di =
1)∨i−1j=1 ((dj = 1)⊕(tj = 1)))’. Note that a proof system for each statement Ui can be
obtained by the ‘OR-composition’ technique from [8] (see [13] for a revised and more
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accurate statement of their results) and [12] on the previously discussed protocol to
prove statement ‘di = 1’ and the previously discussed protocol to prove statement
‘ ∨i−1j=1 ((dj = 1) ⊕ (tj = 1))’. This composition results in a 3-message proof system
for Ui where the verifier sends a single challenge, satisfying completeness, soundness
(under the discrete logarithm assumption), and honest-verifier zero-knowledge. All
these properties are directly implied from the results in [8, 12, 13] about the OR-
composition technique.
Moreover, we note that proving statement Φ1(d, t) only requires proving up to
m+ 1 Ui statements. This can be done using the ‘AND-composition’ technique from
[8, 12] on the just discussed protocol to prove statement Ui . This composition results
in a 3-message proof system for proving statement Φ1(d, t) where the verifier sends
a single challenge, satisfying completeness, soundness (under the discrete logarithm
assumption), and honest-verifier zero-knowledge. All these properties are directly
implied from the results in [8, 12, 13] about the AND-composition technique.
Finally, we note that the resulting protocol is a 3-message, honest-verifier zero-
knowledge lower-bound proof system for language GT.
The 1-message construction. These proof systems can be made non-interactive us-
ing the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [17] of computing the verifier’s challenge as the output
of a hash on the input and the proof system’s first message. Under the random-oracle
assumption, the resulting protocol is a 1-message protocol maintaining the complete-
ness and soundness properties of the corresponding 3-message protocol, and further
satisfying zero-knowledge property.
Time and communication complexity. We stress that the described protocol has
time and communication complexity comparable to at most m executions of the pro-
tocol from [31] (despite the formula for Φ1(d, t) having size quadratic in m).
Equality proof system. We note that a 1-message equality proof system for the above
proof system (KG,E,D) is obtained as follows. The prover simply sends both seeds
s1, s2 to the verifier. The latter computes all values ai, bi , for i = 1, . . . ,m, and returns
accept if and only if zi = gai hti ·bi modp, for i = 1, . . . ,m.
3.3 Lower-bound and equality proofs under standard intractability assumptions
We define an encryption scheme and a lower-bound proof system for the associ-
ated language GT, based on an arbitrary public-key encryption scheme and the in-
tractability of quadratic residuosity modulo Blum-Williams (BW) integers. The re-
sulting lower-bound proof system requires 1 message in the non-interactive model
(i.e., in the presence of a common random string), where it is zero-knowledge. The
communication and time complexity of the proof system are, respectively, quadratic
and cubic in the value m, defined as the length of the first input to the proof system.
Specifically, we obtain the following
Theorem 2 Assuming the existence of public-key encryption schemes, and the hard-
ness of deciding quadratic residuosity modulo BW integers, there exists, construc-
tively, a 1-message zero-knowledge lower-bound proof system in the non-interactive
model with communication complexity quadratic in m and time complexity cubic in
m.
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We note that this solution avoids using random oracles, but is not as efficient in terms
of communication and time complexity. In practice, however, an auction protocol
does not require the greatest time efficiency from a lower-bound proof system since
the verification of such proofs can be performed off-line, i.e., at the end of the auction.
The rest of this subsection is devoted to proving Theorem 2. We note that every
language in N P has a non-interactive computational zero-knowledge proof system
under the hardness of deciding quadratic residuosity [5] or even more general com-
plexity assumptions [18]. However, a lower-bound proof system based on these proof
systems would have a much less efficient communication and time complexity than
the one claimed in the theorem. Naturally, we consider non-interactive perfect zero-
knowledge proof systems which are, however, only known for a relatively small class
of languages, including formula compositions over quadratic residuosity statements
[10, 11, 15]. Using some of these schemes, we can achieve a scheme with the per-
formance claimed in the theorem. Rewriting formula Φ0 in its equivalent form Φ1 is
crucial to be able to apply the known results from [15].
We start the proof of Theorem 2 by recalling basic definitions of the tools and
assumptions used and then present our construction.
Tools and assumptions. For each integer x, we say that z ∈ Z∗x is a quadratic residue
modulo x if there exists an integer r ∈ Z∗x such that r2 ≡ zmodx. If such r does not
exist, we say that z is a quadratic non residue modulo x. The quadratic residuosity
predicate of an integer y ∈ Z∗x can be defined as Qx(y) = 0 if y is a quadratic residue
modulo x and 1 otherwise. A Blum-Williams (BW) integer is an integer x that is
product of two primes ≡ 3 mod 4 and enjoys the following properties: the set Z∗x can
be partitioned into 2 equal-size sets Z+1x ,Z−1x , where Zcx denoted the subset of inte-
gers from Z∗x having Jacobi symbol c; the set Z+1x can be partitioned into 2 equal-size
sets QRx,QNRx , denoting the sets of integers from Z+1x that are quadratic residues
and quadratic non residues modulo x, respectively; the integer −1 is in QNRx and the
product of two elements in QNRx is in QRx . The problem of deciding quadratic resid-
uosity modulo BW integers is the problem of returning Qx(y) for a given y ∈ Z+1x ,
and the assumption that this problem is hard, called the quadratic residuosity assump-
tion, has been used as a base for cryptographic protocols (starting with [20]).
A 1-message construction in the non-interactive model. Our public-key encryption
scheme (KG,E,D) is defined as follows. On input 1k , algorithm KG generates k-
bit primes p,q ≡ 3 mod 4, computes x = pq , sets pk = x, sk = (p, q) and returns
(pk, sk).
On input public key pk and m-bit message d , algorithm E does the following.
First, it writes d in its binary expansion d1 ◦ · · · ◦ dm. Then, for i = 1, . . . ,m, it
randomly chooses ri ∈ Z∗x and computes zi = (−1)di r2i modx. Finally, algorithm E
returns ciphertext c = (z1, . . . , zm).
On input public key pk, secret key sk and ciphertext c = (z1, . . . , zm), algorithm
D does the following. For i = 1, . . . ,m algorithm D sets di = 1 if zi is a quadratic
non-residue modulo x, or di = 0 if zi is a quadratic residue modulo x. In other words,
di = Qx(zi). Finally, D returns plaintext d = d1 ◦ · · · ◦ dm.
Given the above cryptosystem (KG,E,D), we can define language
GT(KG,E,D) = {(1m;pk; c; t) s.t. |D(sk,pk, c)| = m, |t | = m, D(sk,pk, c) > t},
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briefly referred as GT, where pk = x, c = (z1, . . . , zm), and sk = (p, q). Because
the conditions |D(sk,pk, c)| = m and |t | = m are satisfied for the above scheme
(KG,E,D), to construct a lower bound proof system for GT, we only need to con-
struct a proof system for proving statement D(sk,pk, c) > t . As before, we use the
circuit Φ1(d, t) defined in the Sect. 3.1, and give a proof system that this circuit is
satisfied when d = D(sk,pk, c) is only known to the prover and is not revealed to the
verifier.
Recall that we can write Φ1(d, t) as ∧i:ti=1Ui , where Ui = ‘((di = 1) ∨i−1j=1
((dj = 1) ⊕ (tj = 1)))’. First of all, we note that each of the substatements ‘(dj =
1) ⊕ (tj = 1)’ can be proved in non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge, as fol-
lows. Since dj = Qx(zj ) and the value of tj is known, to prove that ‘(Qx(zj ) =
1) ⊕ (tj = 1)’, it is enough to prove a single quadratic residuosity statement; that
is, ‘Qx((−1)tj zj modx) = 1’. Then, each formula Ui can be seen as an OR of i
quadratic non residuosity statement, which we know how to prove in non-interactive
perfect zero-knowledge [15], and the AND of all formulae Ui can therefore be proved
in non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge [5], in the presence of a common random
string. If we let (A,B) be the non-interactive perfect zero-knowledge proof system
for proving the OR of two or more quadratic non-residuosity statements (modulo a
BW integer) given in [15], then, given x, z1, . . . , zm, t1, . . . , tm, our final protocol can
be seen as the sequential and independent composition of proof system (A,B) on in-
put (x; z1, (−1)1−t1); and then, for i = 2, . . . ,m+ 1, of proof system (A,B) on input
(x; zi, (−1)1−ti , (−1)t1z1, . . . , (−1)ti−1zi−1).
Equality proof system. We note that a 1-message equality proof system for the above
scheme (KG,E,D) is obtained as follows. The prover sends r1, . . . , rm to the verifier.
The latter returns accept if and only if zi = (−1)ti r2i modx, for i = 1, . . . ,m.
4 A proxy auction scheme with server-integrity
In this section we present a 1-server proxy auction scheme which enjoys the server-
integrity property. Using any of the two variants of the lower-bound proof systems in
Sect. 3, we obtain a different variant of a 1-server proxy auction scheme. One variant
admits more efficient proofs of server integrity, but assumes the existence of random
oracles. Another variant admits less efficient proofs of server integrity but is based on
a standard cryptographic hardness assumption.
First of all we describe a proxy auction scheme based on an arbitrary lower-bound
proof system. Then we show that the described scheme satisfies the requirements of
the definition in Sect. 2. The basic ideas underlying the proxy auction scheme consist
of the server proving, using 1-message zero-knowledge proofs, that he is honestly
running the price update protocol. In particular, there are two types of updates the
server could be doing when receiving a new bid: updating the winner name and the
item price. While updating the item price, the server considers the previously winning
bid and the new bid, and reveals the decryption of the smaller one. This directly sets
the current item price equal to the revealed bid plus a minimal increment. However,
this also directly declares the currently winning client as either the previously win-
ning client or the client who sent the latest bid. In order to prove that this decision was
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made correctly, the server will have to prove that one encryption of a bid is larger than
the revealed smaller bid. All these proofs are required to be zero-knowledge so to pre-
serve the privacy of the currently winning maximum price as it could be the auction
winner’s maximum price. Moreover, they are required to be realizable in at most 2
messages so to preserve the round-complexity of the auction scheme. The realization
of these ideas will make crucial use of the 1-message zero-knowledge lower-bound
and equality proof systems that we have constructed in Sect. 3. We divide the formal
description into two phases: a setup phase and an auction phase.
Setup phase. The server S chooses a security parameter 1k , a price parame-
ter 1m, a minimal increment Δ ∈ {0,1}m, a starting date sd, a deadline date dd,
some item data id and a starting price sp. Then he sets current price cp = sp,
currently winning bid cwb = cp. The server generates pair (pk, sk) = KG(1k) and
randomly chooses a tuple y = (y1, . . . , ym) as a valid encryption of cp using al-
gorithm E and public key pk. Thus, the currently winning encrypted bid cweb
is set to y = (y1, . . . , ym). Finally the server posts on the public site the tuple
(1k,1m, sd,dd, id, cp,Δ,pk, (y1, . . . , ym)), and keeps (sk, cwb) secret.
Auction phase. At any time between sd and dd a client Ci can decide to register to
participate in the auction of item id. The details of this step are inessential for the rest
of the scheme. Once registered, client Ci can run the bidding protocol Πb to bid some
maximum price mpi ∈ {0,1}m she would be interested in paying for id. Protocol Πb
goes as follows:
1. Ci writes mpi in binary, as d1 ◦ · · · ◦ dm.
2. Ci uses E to compute a ciphertext eb as encrypted bid of d1 ◦ · · · ◦ dm.
3. Ci generates the first message mes1 for the lower-bound proof.
4. Ci sends (eb,mes1) to S, in a time-stamped and authenticated way.
Digital signatures can be used to send the bid message in an authenticated way.
This avoids the possibility that a dishonest server claims that some client has sent a
bid (for example, a very high one) that she has not really sent.
Upon receiving (eb,mes1) from a client Ci , the server S runs protocol Πpu to
eventually update the current price cp, the currently winning bid cwb and the cur-
rently winning encrypted bid cweb. Protocol Πpu goes as follows:
1. Using sk, server S computes the decryption (d1, . . . , dm) of the encrypted bid eb.
2. Let mpi be the integer whose binary expression is d1 ◦ · · · ◦ dm.
3. If mpi ≤ cp, then
• S computes a 1-message equality proof πeb that (1m,pk, eb, t) ∈ EQ, for t =
mpi ;
• S posts on a public site a bid transcript containing signed transcripts of the
received bid (eb,mes1), the equality proof πeb , and an “invalid” message.
4. If mpi ≥ cwb + Δ then:
• S computes a 1-message equality proof πcweb that (1m,pk, cweb, t) ∈ EQ, for
t = cwb (thus, proving that the currently winning encrypted bid cweb is an
encryption of cwb);
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• S computes the second message of the lower-bound proof system to prove that
(1m,pk, eb, t) ∈ GT , for t = cwb + Δ;
• S updates the current winning encrypted bid cweb = eb, the current price cp =
cwb + Δ and the current winning bid cwb = mpi ;
• S posts on a public site the bid transcript containing signed transcripts of the
received bid (eb,mes1), the equality proof πcweb, the lower-bound proof, the
updated currently winning encrypted bid y and the current price cp.
Else (cp + Δ ≤ mpi < cwb + Δ):
• S computes a 1-message equality proof πeb that (1m,pk, eb, t) ∈ EQ, for t =
mpi (thus, proving that the received encrypted bid eb is an encryption of mpi );
• S computes the second message of the lower-bound proof system to prove that
(1m,pk, cweb, t) ∈ GT , for t = mpi − Δ;
• S updates the current price cp = mpi + Δ;
• S posts on a public site the bid transcript containing signed transcripts of the
received bid (eb,mes1), the equality proof πeb , the lower-bound proof, and the
current price cp.
Remark on public verifiability. We have designed the scheme so that the server’s
honest behavior is publicly verifiable; that is, all parties can verify the correctness of
the server’s updates of both the current price and the currently winning encrypted bid.
If this property is not required, minor modifications are needed; for instance, rather
than posting all proofs, the server will send proofs only to the involved client in each
bidding operation.
4.1 Properties of the scheme
Theorem 3 Assuming the existence of the 1-message zero-knowledge lower-bound
proof system and equality proof system, the 1-server secure proxy auction scheme
explained above satisfies the following properties:
1. the scheme preserves the round complexity of the proxy auction scheme;
2. the “privacy against clients” property holds, thanks to the zero-knowledge prop-
erty of the lower-bound proof system used.
3. the “security against clients” property holds unconditionally;
4. the “security against server” property holds, thanks to the soundness property of
both types of proof systems used.
Proof First of all we stress that the scheme preserves the round-complexity of the
proxy auction scheme. The bidding protocol only consists of a single message from a
client to the server (which is anyway required by the class of proxy auction protocols
that we consider, as the client needs to send his bid to the server). The price update
protocol only consists of a single message from the server to a client (which is anyway
required by the proxy auction protocol, as the server needs to reply to the client’s bid).
We continue now by showing that the above scheme satisfies the requirements as
in the definition in Sect. 2.
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Correctness. This property is easy to verify. In particular, note that the server,
given the secret key sk, can always compute the maximum price sent by any client
in their encrypted bid, and therefore properly update the currently winning bid to
the maximum price obtained from any client. We also recall that our two encryption
schemes defined in Sect. 3 admit a lower-bound proof system and then note that
they admit a 1-message equality proof system for proving the value of an encrypted
bid: in both cases, indeed, the decryption algorithm can compute witnesses that the
decryption of a certain value is valid (specifically, the seeds s1, s2 in the case of
the scheme in Sect. 3.2, and the square roots ri of the values (−1)ti zi modx, for
i = 1, . . . ,m, for the scheme in Sect. 3.3).
Security against clients. This property is almost automatically derived from the
scheme, since possibly dishonest players have no way to prevent a honest player who
bids the maximum price to actually win the auction. This is achieved thanks to the
fact that the server is honestly following her instructions.
Privacy against clients. We need to prove the two parts of this requirement: the
current winner privacy and the final winner privacy. We start with the latter, as the
former is an extension of it.
To show that final winner privacy is satisfied, we argue that a bidder who is never
outbid by any other client can keep her maximum price “sufficiently” private (that is,
private among all possible values of a bid that are greater than the final price of the
auction item, that is required to be public by the auction rule.) It is clear from the
development of the auction that the bidder’s maximum price must be larger than the
previously winning bid (or otherwise this client would have been outbid). However,
we now show that no other information is revealed to the other clients about the
value of this maximum price. First of all we note that each bidder only sends an
encryption of her maximum value, without never revealing it in clear (and so is the
server doing since she is never required to do so and she is assumed to be honest).
Furthermore, the only other steps in the scheme that depend on this value are those
from the server who must prove that this value is larger than some other maximum
price that is submitted (specifically, the ‘else’ part of step 4 in protocol Πpu). Since
this proof is zero-knowledge, it does not allow an efficient algorithm to compute
the bidder’s maximum value better than without access to the lower-bound proof.
However, with no access to this proof, the only information related to this value is
its encryption and thus the only successful strategy to guess some information about
the value of this maximum price is to break its encryption, which is infeasible by the
security property of encryption.
The proof that the current winner privacy requirement is satisfied is essentially the
same, but holds, as required from the definition in Sect. 2, only in more restricted
time and item price intervals, due to the item price changes caused by future bids.
Specifically, there are two main cases for this.
In the first case, a current winner Ci had bid a maximum price mpi at time t1
when the item was priced cp, and at a later time t2 another client bids a maximum
price mp′i < mpi . Then after time t2, the item price changes to cp′ = mp′i + Δ, and
Ci remains the current winner. As both facts are publicly revealed by the server, this
implies that mpi > cp′ −Δ. However, in the time interval [t1, t2], the same reasoning
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as for the final winner privacy can be applied, and the price mpi is, from the point of
view of all other clients, still undetermined within the interval [cp,2m − 1], except
with negligible probability.
In the second case, the current winner Ci is outbid at a later time t3 when another
client bids a maximum price mp′i > mpi . Then after time t3, the item price changes to
cp′′ = mpi +Δ, and Ci is not the current winner any more. As both facts are publicly
revealed by the server, this implies that mpi = cp′′ − Δ and thus no more privacy is
left about the value mpi . However, in the time interval [t2, t3], the same reasoning as
for the final winner privacy can be applied, and the price mpi is, from the point of
view of all other clients, still undetermined within the interval [cp′,2m − 1], except
with negligible probability.
Security against server. We assume client Ci and server S′ run an execution of
the bidding protocol Πb , where Ci submits a maximum price mpi ≥ cp + Δ, and
an execution of price update protocol Πpu, at the end of which S′ publicly posts a
bid transcript. We need to prove the two parts of this requirement: the update of the
currently winning bidder and the update of the current price. In both parts, we show
that any such polynomial-time algorithm S′ cannot convince another polynomial-
time algorithm J unless S′ followed the protocol, where J only needs to verify
the proofs and any new settings of value cp in the bid transcript posted by the
server S′.
In the first case, the update of the currently winning bidder, we assume that
mpi ≥ cwb + Δ and that, towards contradiction, this execution of Πb does not re-
sult in the current price and currently winning bid to be updated to cwb +Δ and mpi ,
respectively. This can happen if in its bid transcript, the server S′ either (a) claims
that mpi ≤ cp or (b) claims that mpi ≤ cwb. However, in case (a), S′ has to show an
equality proof that mpi is equal to some value ≤ cp, and, because of the soundness
property, such a proof would be convincing only with probability exponentially small
in k. Similarly, in case (b), S′ has to show both an equality proof that mpi is equal to
some value less than cwb, and a lower-bound proof that the bid encrypted by cweb is
> mpi − Δ. Here, the soundness of the lower-bound proof implies that, unless with
probability exponentially small in k, S′ at best manages to obtain a convincing lower-
bound proof for a value of mpi less than cwb, in which case the soundness property
of the equality proof implies that S′ produces a convincing lower-bound proof only
with probability exponentially small in k.
In the second case, the update of the current price, we assume that cp+Δ ≤ mpi <
cwb + Δ and that, towards contradiction, this execution of Πb does not result in the
current price to be updated to cp + Δ. This can happen if in its bid transcript, the
server S′ either (a) claims that mpi ≤ cp or (b) claims that mpi ≥ cwb + Δ. Here,
case (a) follows from the soundness property of the equality proof, as already noted
above. Moreover, in case (b), S′ has to show both an equality proof that cweb encrypts
a value cwb, and a lower-bound proof that mpi ≥ cwb +Δ. By the soundness of both
proofs, this results in two convincing proofs only with probability exponentially small
in k. 
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5 Conclusions and future work
We uncovered a novel class of attacks that a server in a proxy auction can mount
against its clients to increase bids or favor one player over another towards winning
the auction. To address these attacks, we proposed techniques based on lower-bound
proof systems to reduce the amount of trust that needs to be put on servers for the
correct functioning of a private proxy auctions.
More attacks are possible from proxy auction servers, including attacks that are
plausible in real-life auctions, such as coalitions of servers and clients trying to con-
vince another, possibly fake, client to take part into the auction and put a higher bid on
an item. Note that if the honest client is bidding without considering the current item
price or the number of participants to the auction (as the auction itself does demand),
then these attacks are of no advantage to the auction server. On the other hand, in real
life clients may not respect this rule and thus the study of these attacks, left as future
work, may be of interest.
Further attacks in proxy auctions include those to the privacy of clients, as all
bids but the winner’s are revealed to all auction participants or followers, due to the
functionality of the proxy auction that we considered. One could use additional cryp-
tographic techniques (for instance, keeping all bids and current price hidden via en-
cryption) to enforce such privacy, but then these techniques would modify the proxy
auction functionality, thus not necessarily capturing real-life auctions such as [1].
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